■１．核使用策定計画の衝撃ーー戦争で核兵器が行使される世界
既にご存じだと思いますが、９日付ロサンゼルス・タイムズは、アメリカが７カ国に対して非常時の核使用計画策定と、より小型の核兵器開発を指示していたこ とを報じ、さらに１０日付ニューヨーク・タイムズは生物化学兵器貯施設を標的にした核攻撃シナリオの策定指示を報じました。核兵器使用の対象に挙げられて いるのは、ロシアをはじめ中国、北朝鮮、イラク、イラン、リビア、シリアで、「悪の枢軸」３国だけでなく、中国やロシアまでも対象に入っています。文書で は、核の使用が想定されるケースとして、（１）通常兵器では撃破できない敵（２）核や生物・化学兵器による攻撃への報復（３）予想を超える軍事上の展開、 の三種類が明記されていると報じられています。

日本の新聞が本格的に報じたのは１０日で、私は会議のため山口でこの記事に接して、非常 に大きな衝撃を受けました。中国新聞では１０日の一面トップで大きく扱っており、全国紙よりも本格的に報道していました（資料３）。おそらく、これは中国 新聞が広島県もカバーしているためだと思われ、参考資料に見ることができるように、中国新聞の報道はこの件に関しては全国紙よりも充実しています。

アメリカ当局者は核使用計画策定の方は政治的考慮から否定していますが、民間研究所グローバル・セキュリティーが核兵器開発指示の文書の抜粋をＨＰで公表 しましたし（資料１３）、ラムズフェルド国防長官は情報漏洩を怒り（資料１０）、ボルトン国務次官（安全保障担当）が事実上認める発言をしておりブッシュ 政権の核攻撃の可能性を認めている（資料１１、１８）ので、報道が真実であることは確実です。参考までに、資料１４にそのＨＰに掲載されている機密文書 Nuclear　Posture Review[Excerpts]を付します。

既に２月２２日の段階でボルトン国務次官）が「核不拡散条約に加盟している非核保有国 には核攻撃をしない」というカーター政権以来の方針を変更する姿勢を見せていました（資料１）から、これが政権レベルで決定されたと見て良いでしょう。こ れは、核不拡散防止条約体制をますます揺るがせるものです。そして、大統領自身が、イラク・北朝鮮などに対して、大量破壊兵器開発に対して先制核攻撃も辞 さないという言明をしました（資料９）。また、前述の秘密文書では、

「一、米国が備えなければならない「直近」「潜在的」「予測不能事態」の三形態の対応計画を想定。核攻撃能力の設定に際しそれらに応じられる戦力を用意。
一、「直近の対応計画」は朝鮮民主主義人民共和国（北朝鮮）による対韓国、イラクの対イスラエル攻撃や台湾をめぐる武力衝突など。
…
一、北朝鮮、イラク、イラン、シリア、リビアは三形態のいずれかに属するが、北朝鮮とイラクは特に恒常的な軍事的懸念となっている。いずれもテロを支援、保護し大量破壊兵器とミサイル開発が活発。」（資料１２）

とされており、特に北朝鮮の韓国攻撃、イラクのイスラエル攻撃、中国の台湾攻撃は、核使用を備えるべき「直近」の事例として具体的に挙げられています。

冷戦時代には、核兵器は抑止力とされており、万一使用されたら人類滅亡の危険を孕むものの、使用することのできない兵器と見做されていました。然るに、この核使用策定計画においては、むしろ具体的な危機において使用することが想定されています。

しかも、テロ支援や大量兵器開発が上記文書では挙げられていますから、政権は、現在の反「テロ」世界戦争において核兵器を使用する可能性を本気で考慮していると考えなければなりません。広島・長崎を始め、世界各地で批判が始まったのも当然です。

核の時計の針が動かされたのも当然です。広島・長崎以来の核兵器使用の危険が、高まっていると言わざるを得ません。これを知って、衝撃を受けないでいられ ましょうか？　核不拡散体制が危機に瀕するのみならず、アメリカは戦争で本当に核兵器が行使される世界へと舵を切ろうとしているのです。これは、黙示録的 世界に他ならないでしょう。

■２．反「テロ」世界戦争への拡大ーーイラク戦線開始
パキスタンでは、ウォール・ストリー ト・ジャーナルのダニエル・パール記者の誘拐・殺害事件（1月）に続き、昨日もイスラマバードのキリスト教会で手投げ弾テロがあり、アメリカ外交官家族を はじめ5人死亡、40人が負傷しました（17日）。今後も、様々なテロが続発することが懸念されます。

これに対して、アメリカは既に反 「テロ」世界戦争を、第２戦線以下へと展開させています。アフガニスタン戦争も継続していますが（アナコンダ作戦）、フィリピンを皮切りに、グルジア、イ エメンにも米軍が派遣されつつあり、さらにはコロンビアやスーダン・ソマリアなどへも派遣が検討されているようです。いよいよ戦線は世界中に広がり、ーー 世界大戦でこそないもののーー「世界戦争」の実質を備えてきたと言って良いでしょう（資料１６）。

この焦点が対イラク戦争であること は、言う迄もありません。アメリカは、イラク攻撃には既に法的根拠がある（個別的・集団的自衛権を定めた国連憲章５１条、停戦決議（安保理決議６８７）違 反）と主張しており（資料１７）、フセイン政権打倒の意思を固めていることは確実です。

実は、同時多発テロとイラクの関係はさほど強く ないわけですが、アメリカ内部では、ーー同時多発テロとは別にーーフセイン政権が核武装する危険性が高いことを論拠として、それ以前に打倒すべきであると 論じられています。この点については、タカ派とハト派の間に大きな差はなく、その論争は主として時期（タカ派ー即刻、ハト派ー時期尚早）と方法に関しての ものとなっているようです（１）。前回述べたように、反「テロ」の論理から反「大量破壊兵器」の論理へと転換しているのは、主としてこのためでしょう。イ ラクの大量破壊兵器＝核武装を阻止して、その前に攻撃するということに趣旨は尽きています。

現在は、具体策を練っている段階と思われ、アメリカでは
１．イラク反体制勢力を支援してフセイン大統領のクーデター・暗殺などを企てる。
２．アフガニスタンの場合のように、空爆を加え、イラク反体制勢力を支援する。
３．本格的地上軍投入。
というシナリオが公然と語られ、議論されています。

フォーラム７５でお知らせしたように、１．や２．の段階は既に始まっており、ＣＩＡ工作員は既にイラクに潜入しているようです。つまり、空爆などの本格的な戦争は勿論現在準備段階ですが、既にそのための第1段階は始まっているのです。即ち、

「【ワシントン２８日共同】二十八日付の米ＵＳＡトゥデー紙は、米中央情報局（ＣＩＡ）がイラクのフセイン政権を打倒するため、内外の反体制組織を支援する秘密計画を進めていると報じた。米政府当局者や元ＣＩＡ高官の話として伝えた。
同紙によると、ＣＩＡはイラク北部で活動する反体制クルド人組織や南部のシーア派イスラム組織の武装化や軍事訓練を計画。同時にイラク軍兵士の寝返り工作を進めるという。
ブッシュ大統領は三週間前にＣＩＡのフセイン政権転覆計画を承認。最近、米外交官やＣＩＡ工作員がイラク北部に潜入した。
米政府はイラク内での工作と並行して、欧州で活動するイラクの反体制派組織イラク国民会議（ＩＮＣ）の元将校らを集めた会合を財政面で支援する。
ブッシュ大統領は大量破壊兵器を生産しているとしてイラクを「悪の枢軸」と位置付け、あらゆる手段でフセイン体制を打倒する意向を表明。軍事行動も辞さない構えで、国防総省は二十万人の米軍兵員を含む対イラク攻撃計画の検討を始めている。」（資料２０）
この記事に続く情報として、ごく最近にも
「イラクの反政府勢力、イラク国民会議（ＩＮＣ）幹部は、米政府がフセイン政権打倒をめざす元イラク政府高官と数週間以内にワシントンで協議することで合意したと述べた」と報じられました（資料１８）。

しかし、ＩＮＣやクルド人勢力などのイラクの反体制派は、フセイン政権に比して弱小なので、アフガニスタンの場合のように北部同盟を空爆で支援するような 形では政権打倒に成功する可能性は必ずしも大きくないと考えられています。湾岸戦争の後でも、フセイン政権は北部クルド人武装勢力やイラク南部の反政府勢 力の蜂起を鎮圧したからです。

そこで、１や２の可能性を試みながらも、それで不十分な場合に、３の地上軍投入というシナリオが論じられています。この場合、一般的に２５万人ぐらいの投入が必要とされています（２）。

これに即して、イギリスはその１割の２万５０００人の出兵を検討しているようです。ブレア首相は支持を表明するに至り、来月5日からテキサス州の大統領別 荘でブッシュ大統領と会談してイラク攻撃への協力を表明する見通しです。さすがに、イギリス国内でも、閣議でクック院内総務を始め複数の閣僚が疑念を表明 して政権内部ですら異論が噴出し、60人を超す与党労働党議員らが「対米支援への懸念」を盛り込んだ動議案に署名しました（9日、朝日）。

■３．イラク攻撃の外交的準備ーー不名誉な日米枢軸
このために、アメリカは何とかイラク戦についての国際的支持を取り付けようとしています。その起点がブッシュ大統領の日本訪問（2月18－19日）でし た。後で親書が朝日新聞でリークされたように、実は日本経済を非常に懸念していたわけですが、表舞台では小泉首相を「偉大な改革者」として持ち上げて、イ ラク戦を念頭に反テロ戦争への支持を取り付けようとしたわけです。流鏑馬の鑑賞は、この訪日の意図を象徴的に表すものでした。馬上からブッシュ大統領が矢 を射る流鏑馬のイラストを送られて、「我々は悪と戦っている」と語った通りです。その矢で「テロリスト」を射ようというのでしょう！

ブッシュ大統領は、「日本は米国の最大の本物の友人の一人だ」とし、「アジア歴訪を日本から始めたことには重要な理由がある」として、日米同盟の意義を強 調しました。同時多発テロ事件以降「日米同盟の強さと、日本の地球規模の欠かせない役割」が示されたとして、対米支援に謝意を表明し、「自由は勝ち残る。 文明
とテロは共存できない。テロを破ることによって世界の平和を守る」と述べました。対イラク軍事行動についても、強い語調で「全ての選択肢はあ る。テーブルの上にそのまま載せておきたい。何一つ排除したくない」と述べて、イラク戦を考えていることを明確にしました。悲しいことに、日本の首相はそ れに応えて事実上の支持表明を行ってしまいました（以上、朝日18ー19日）。

日本との絆をことさらに謳ったのは、フランスやドイツ （フィッシャー外相）をはじめとするヨーロッパ諸国、さらにはイギリスですらイラク戦争には反対の気運が強いからです。特に、フランスはジョスパン首相・ ベドリヌ外相・リシャール国防相と一致して批判しており、アメリカを苛立たせています（資料２２・２３）。そこで、アメリカは最も従順な日本から最初に公 式な支持を取り付けることにしたものと思われます。

日本は、やはりアメリカの最も従順な随従国家であること、一の子分国家たることを表 してしましまいました。北朝鮮が「日米イスラエル」こそ「悪の枢軸」と批判しています（資料２１）が、この時点では、実際に日米枢軸とでも呼べる状態だっ たのです！　アフガニスタン戦争の時にも日本政府は最もアメリカに随従で最も早く軍隊派遣を決めたので、私は論説で「日英米枢軸」と批判的に揶揄しました が、今回はヨーロッパが明確に批判しているので、イラク戦への支持形成における日米枢軸が誰の目にも際だっています。

反「テロ」世界戦争のイラク戦線は、日米枢軸によって準備が開始されたことーーこれほど平和国家・日本にとって不名誉なことはないでしょう。

■４．イラク攻撃のための停戦ーー便宜的なパレスチナ和平圧力
現在は、チェイニー副大統領が１０日から中東１２カ国を歴訪中で、イラク攻撃への支持を取り付けようとしていますが、ヨルダン・エジプト・イエメン・オ マール・アラブ首長国連邦に続いてサウジアラビアすらもイラク攻撃に反対し、基地提供などの協力に難色を示しました（16日）。中東諸国からすれば、湾岸 戦争当時と違ってイラクの脅威は現在はさほどないのに対して、パレスチナ問題は深刻な情勢にあるからです。

そこで、アメリカは、中東諸国の支持を確保するために、パレスチナ国家に言及して「イスラエルとパレスチナの二つの国家」の平
和共存を求める国連安保理決議案を初めて提出しました（１２日）。そして、サウジアラビアのアブドラ皇太子の中東和平構想にも関心を示し、これまでとは姿勢を変化させて、イスラエルの強硬策を批判して和平に応じるように圧力をかけ始めました。

イスラエルはますます凶暴になっており、ラマラ制圧というような最大規模の軍事作戦を行いましたが、ジニ米特使の仲介に当たって、アラファト議長の軟禁を 解除しました。さらに、アメリカの強い圧力を受けて当初の決定を変更し、ラマラなどから撤退して、停戦に応じて交渉の席に着く姿勢を見せています。16日 には、「シャロン首相が17日に三者会談を開催して停戦宣言をする」という声明を首相府が勇み足で発表し後撤回しましたが、18日には「自治区域からイス ラエルが撤退した後はパレスチナ政府が治安維持にあたる」という現場司令官の合意が成立して停戦宣言へと準備が進みつつあるようです（朝日、夕刊18 日）。

パレスチナ国家の承認は重要ですし、停戦自体は、勿論望ましいことです。しかし、この背景を考えると必ずしも素直に喜べません。 アメリカの和平圧力は、イラク攻撃のための便宜的なものに過ぎず、この停戦は、仮に成立したとしても、イラク攻撃の下準備に他ならないからです。それ故、 遅くともイラク攻撃が終わってしまえば、また元の状態に戻ってしまうことが危惧されます。あるいは、それまでも持たず、ジニ特使が帰ってしまえば崩壊する かもしれません。シャロン首相が本当に全占領地からの撤退をする気になるとは到底思えないからです。おそらく、単にアメリカの圧力を受けて一時的に譲歩す るに過ぎず、自爆テロなどをきっかけにしてーーあるいはパレスチナ側幹部暗殺などによってそのような事件を発生させーー再び強硬策に戻る機会を虎視眈々と 伺うことでしょう。

アフガニスタン戦争の段階でも、開戦以前にアメリカはイスラーム諸国の支持を得るために、パレスチナ国家構想に言及 したりして、若干パレスチナ側に配慮を見せました。しかし、だからと言って本当に停戦・和平が達成されたわけではなく、逆にイスラエル側は「反テロ戦争」 の論理を悪用してパレスチナ抑圧を強め、紛争の激化を招いて現在に至っています。

今回も、同じことが繰り返されないように願いたいと思 います。現在は一時的にアメリカが圧力を強めて停戦への気運が生まれてきても、イラク戦が対立の構図を激化させ、戦争中ないし戦争後にパレスチナでの暴力 が一層激しくなって「戦争」へと逆戻りすることのないように。そして、パレスチナ国家が真に成立して平和共存が可能になるように。

■５．核行使の誘惑ーー不審なアナコンダ作戦の「教訓」
イラク戦は、上述の１．２．の方法ではフセイン政権打倒までは至らないことが予想され、３．のような大規模な地上軍の派遣が考えられています。しかし、ここで危惧されることがあります。

最近、アメリカは何故か今頃になって、アナコンダ（大蛇）作戦という、過去最大規模の地上戦を行いました。アフガニスタン東部山岳地帯（パクティア州シャ ヒコット渓谷）でアルカイダータリバンの８００人ほどの残存兵を包囲殲滅して掃討するために、１０００人以上の米地上軍（空挺・山岳部隊で攻撃役、さらに アフガン人部隊1000人が逃走防止の封じ込め役、欧州・オーストラシア兵200人）を投入したのです（3月2日）。

空からも2000 回以上の空爆を加えましたが、、手痛い反撃に遭って、3月4日には大型ヘリコプター2機が墜落し、死者８人と負傷者50人を出しました（アフガン人部隊は 死者３，負傷２５）。アメリカ側は、アルカイダータリバン側の５００－８００人を殺害し「勢力の中核を破壊した」としていましたが、最近になって戦果が疑 わしくなってきました。地元部隊は、合わせて45人分ぐらいの遺体しか発見できず、大半は戦闘中に山道からパキスタン側に逃亡したという証言も現れたから です（朝日、18日）。

もし、これが本当ならば、この作戦は双方の陣営で死者の比率が1対５ぐらいだったことになり、大失敗と言わざる を得ません。ある意味では、拙論「追悼　終戦への祈り――アフガニスタン・テロの犠牲者に捧ぐ」の「４．死線へと向かう危険――アメリカへの警告」で警告 したように、地上戦になるとアメリカ側の犠牲者も無視できなくなるということを実証したことになるかもしれません。

アナコンダ作戦は 終了しましたが、タリバーンやアルカイダがアフガニスタン南部・東部でゲリラ戦のために再結集を始めたという情報があります。パキスタンがヘクマチエル氏 を支援することを決めるなどの動きもあり、軍閥間の対立や治安の悪化の伝えられるアフガニスタンの前途は、なお予断を許さないようです。

それにしても、何故、今頃になって、アメリカは敢えてこのような地上戦を行ったのでしょうか？　表面的には、トラボラ攻撃で、地上戦を地元勢力に頼ったた めにアルカイダ兵の逃走を許してしまったからです。そこで、今回は米軍が自ら「包囲殲滅」を行うことにして、作戦名も「アナコンダ（大蛇）作戦」としたわ けです。

しかし同時にーー憶測に過ぎませんがーー私には、深層心理において、アメリカ側はイラク戦を意識して、いわばその予行演習とし てこの作戦を行ったような気がするのです。ソマリアからの撤退以来、米軍は地上戦に弱く、地上戦を行えないという見方が強くなっていました。しかし、アフ ガニスタン戦争とは異なってイラク戦争では、地上戦は不可避かもしれません。そこで、地上戦も遂行できるという自信を得るために、アフガニスタンで地上戦 を敢えて行ってみたのではないでしょうか。

しかし、この作戦によって逆に、地上戦になると、やはり相当の犠牲が出ることが明らかになり ました。イラクで本格的な地上戦を行えば、やはり米軍にも犠牲者は避けられないでしょう。そして、このような「教訓」をアメリカが認識したときに、非常に 大きな危険が現れてくるような気がします。

アフガニスタン戦争で、初期には予想以上にアルカイダータリバン側は空爆に耐えて抵抗を続け ていました。この抵抗が潰えた一つの理由は、抵抗に手こずったアメリカが、途中で通常の空爆ではなく、デイジー・カッターという準原爆の大型爆弾を使った ことにあるのではないか、と思います。

同じことがイラクについても再現する可能性が存在するのではないでしょうか？　即ち、１．や２． のシナリオがうまく行かずに、３．の地上戦のシナリオに突入した時、そしてイラク側の抵抗に手こずって、米軍の被害が無視できなくなるときに、アメリカに は、デイジー・カッターはおろか、小型核兵器を使用する誘惑が生じるではないでしょうか？　これが、冒頭に紹介した報道が指し示す最も現実的な危険である ように思えます。

時期的にも、アナコンダ作戦と核使用策定計画の暴露とは、奇妙に符合しています。アナコンダ作戦で米兵が死んだのが3 月4日、核使用策定計画の報道が９日です。報道された機密文書自体は、国防総省が今年一月九日に概要を発表した核戦略の指針となる「核体制の見直し」の非 公開部分ですから、アナコンダ作戦とは直接の関係はありません。しかし、この文書の報道とともに、アメリカ政府に核使用も辞さないという悪しき決意が固 まってきているような気がするのです。これが、杞憂に過ぎないことを望みたいと思います。

■６．アメリカ帝国の夷狄討伐世界戦争ーー死線の完全突破
振りかえって見ると、この戦争の当初から私の訴えてきた危険は、悲しむべきことに、ほとんど現実化しつつあります。「追悼　終戦への祈り――アフガニスタ ン・テロの犠牲者に捧ぐ」で、「ここで止めよ」と書き、これ以上の犠牲を増やさないように祈ると共に、文明間戦争への拡大を避けるために絶対に突破しては ならない死線として、次の四つを挙げました。

１．本格的地上戦突入
２．イラクなどアフガニスタン以外の国への攻撃
３．パレスチナ問題の発火
４.　無辜の民の犠牲者数

１.の本格的地上戦突入はアフガニスタン戦争では辛うじて回避され、主として空爆の段階でタリバン政権が崩壊したので、アフガニスタン戦争で一気にこれらが全て突破される危険は避けられました。テロ直後の大量報復を一応自制して限定空爆を行った成果と言えるでしょう。

しかし、その後の展開を見ると、決して喜ぶことは出来ません。１．についても、イラクについて前述のような危険が現れてきています。２．のアフガニスタン以外の地域に対する攻撃も上記のように現実化し始めており、特にイラクはその焦点をなします。

また、３．のパレスチナ問題は、連日悲惨な流血事件が発生しており、既に戦争状態と言っても過言ではありません。2000年9月末にインティファーダが始 まってから、12日までに双方の死者は計1500人（パレスチナ側1190人、イスラエル側349人）に達しています（資料１９）。いわば、「パレスチナ 戦争」と言うことが出来るでしょう。

さらに、前回論じたように、「４．無辜の犠牲者数」については、アフガンの無辜の民の犠牲者数はア メリカの同時多発テロ約3000人を超えてしまいました。パレスチナ1500人、アフガニスタン3000人というこの死者数を見るだけでも、既にアフガニ スタンとパレスチナで戦争が行われ、無辜の人命が大量に失われていることがわかります。そして、さらにイラク戦となれば、犠牲者数が決定的に増加すること は火を見るよりも明らかです。

従って、アフガニスタン戦争だけを独立して見ずにここまでを全体として見ると、いずれの死線も既に突破さ れたか、突破寸前の状態にあることになります。イラク戦開始とともに、この４つは完全に突破されてしまうことになるでしょう。今は、文明間戦争、世界戦争 という悲惨な事態に展開する瀬戸際にあるわけです。既にアメリカの頭上には地球的正義は存在しないと思いますが、イラク戦まで開始し、さらに核兵器使用ま で考えるに至っては、もはや断固と
して存在しないと言わざるをえないでしょう。

否、「時評：『悪の枢軸』を語る『戦争屋』ーー アメリカ世界帝国主義論と『米帝』中東・朝鮮戦争の脅威」（フォーラム６９）で述べたように、アメリカの帝国主義的戦争であるが故に、アメリカ自体が地球 的な公共悪の担い手となってしまうと言って良いでしょう。「悪の枢軸」と名指された北朝鮮やイランのみならず、アメリカ内部のニューヨーク・タイムズです らも、社説（十二日付）で
、「ある国が非核国に対する核先制攻撃や新型核兵器の開発を計画したならば、米国はその国に『危険な、ならず者国家』の らく印を押すだろう」と指摘し、同機密文書はこうした政策を提案したものであり「ブッシュ大統領はこの文書を国防総省に突き返すべきだ」と述べました（資 料７）。これは、かねてからチョムスキーらが指摘してきた真実、即ち、「今や、アメリカこそ、危険な、ならず者
国家である」ということに他なりません。

前述したように、実はイラクはあまり同時多発テロとは深い関わりを持っておらず、イラク戦争は、反「テロ」戦争というよりも反「大量破壊兵器」戦争という 論理に立脚しています。この二つに共通しているのは、テロといい、大量破壊兵器といい、「武力・暴力を以てアメリカに楯突く国家は崩壊させる」という論理 です。

これは、帝国の征服の論理であり、いわば蛮族ないし夷狄を制圧する論理と言ってよいでしょう。古来より、帝国は、それに抵抗する 「敵」を、文明化していない蛮族ないし夷狄と見做して、討伐を行ってきました。アメリカが今回の反テロ戦争を「文明と野蛮の戦い」と特徴づけたのは、正し くその現代版に他ならず、アメリカ帝国の「夷狄討伐ないし殲滅」が、その本質に他なりません。

それ故に、反「テロ」世界戦争とは、文明 論的には、「アメリカ帝国の夷狄討伐世界戦争」と把握することができるのです。要は、生意気にもアメリカに楯突く「テロ」組織やその保護国家、そしてイラ クを壊滅させることーーこれが、帝国の本音でしょう。だからこそ、アルカイダのような「テロリスト」には一片の同情も示さずに、殲滅して殺そうとしている のです。テロリストは「殲滅」し、北朝鮮やイラクのような抵抗する国家は「討伐」して崩壊させるーーこれが、「米帝」世界戦争の実体だろうと思います。

■７．世界戦争への拡大と長期化ーー次期大統領選への戦争選挙戦術
残念ながら、現状では、アフガニスタン戦争・パレスチナ戦争に加えて、イラク戦、そして「反『テロ』世界戦争＝アメリカ帝国の夷狄殲滅戦争」への拡大は、 もはや殆ど不可避の成り行きのようにすら見えます。何よりも、ブッシュ政権に確固たる対イラク開戦と戦線拡大の意思が存在し、政権がすぐに崩壊したり根本 的な方向転換をしたりする可能性は低いように見えるからです。

同時多発テロ直後の大量報復攻撃こそアメリカは賢明にも回避しましたが、 結果的には、時間をかけて同様の大規模戦争を行う道を選択してしまっているようです。ブッシュ政権が持続する限り、ーーパレスチナ問題においてはシャロン 政権が持続する限りはーー戦争に終止符を打って平和へと戻ることは難しいと言わざるを得ません。
私は、イラク攻撃を本当に行おうとしているのを 見て、少なくともブッシュ政権の任期が終わる2004年までは、「平和のための戦い＝和戦」を継続する覚悟を持つ必要があると考えるようになりました。今 年の中間選挙への過程を見て思うのですが、エンロン疑惑を始めとする内政問題をかわすために、ブッシュ政権はことさらに強硬策を取ろうとしているようで す。そして、このような傾向は、中
間選挙が終わっても持続し、次の大統領選挙まで続く可能性が高いと思えるのです。

父・ブッ シュ政権は湾岸戦争当時は圧倒的な国民の支持を得ていましたが、戦争終結後の大統領選挙では人気が急落してクリントン氏に敗北する結果になってしまいまし た。他方、フセイン政権は力で反政府蜂起を鎮圧したので、結果としてブッシュ大統領が退いてもフセイン大統領は政権の座にあり、あたかもフセインの側が逆 に勝利したような形になりました。この屈辱感が、ブッシュ父子にあって、現在のイラク攻撃の心理的要因になっていることは疑いないでしょう。

私が恐れるのは、ブッシュ大統領はここから「大統領選挙まで戦争を終結させない」という悪しき「教訓」を引き出すのではないか、ということです。中間選挙 はおろか、次期大統領選挙まで反「テロ」戦争を続けていれば、国民の高支持率を持続して大統領選挙に勝利することができる、と考える恐れがあるのではない でしょうか？

つまり、戦争の継続をいわば「選挙戦術＝戦争選挙戦術」とし、それによって大統領としての再任を可能にしようと企む危険性 があると思うのです。ブッシュ政権自体が、「この反テロ戦争は長期化し、何年も、あるいは何十年もかかる」と公言しています。恐ろしいのは、この政権の場 合、「悪の枢軸」発言のように、レトリックとして片づけることができず、その後実際に実力を行使する危険性
が高いことです。

そ して、この言明には、単に準軍事的な考慮だけではなく、実は大統領としての再任という政治的野望も働いているのではない？ーーこれが、私の持つ疑問です。 もしそうだとすれば、仮にイラク戦でフセイン政権が打倒されても、まだ戦争は終わらないかもしれません。次に、北朝鮮、イラン、リビア等々と、順に獲物を 求めて戦争を続けていくのはないでしょうか？

従って、私達は、この戦争の拡大と長期化とを覚悟せざるを得ないと思うのです。万一、ブッ シュ政権の戦争選挙戦術が成功したら？ーーそのようなことは想像したくもありません。遅くとも2004年までに、国内政治情勢で追いつめられ、国際的にも 戦争戦術が破綻して、「戦争政権」が敗北・崩壊することを祈りたいと思います。

■８．イラク戦の最悪シナリオーー核戦争と中東戦争
この陰鬱な見通しに加えて、核使用計画策定という衝撃的なニュースによって、さらに輪をかけた危険が現れることになってしまいました。アフガニスタン戦争 の場合と同様に、イラク戦についても最悪シナリオを想定してみましょう。これは、この世界戦争、ことにイラク戦線において核兵器が使用され、核戦争になっ てしまうというシナリオです。

アメリカが地上戦に突入せざるを得なくなるとき、そしてさらにイラク側が頑強に抵抗して米兵の犠牲が増加 してゆくときに、この危険が生じるかもしれません。さらに、イラクは、アメリカから先制攻撃を受ければ、湾岸戦争時のように、中東諸国の支持を得るため に、イスラエルに攻撃を仕掛ける危険性が存在するでしょう。前述のように、これこそ、アメリカが「直近」として核行使を想定している事態に他なりません。

さらに、湾岸戦争時とは異なって、もしイラクから攻撃を受ければ、イスラエルのシャロン首相は、ーーいかにアメリカが自制を求めてもーー自制することな く、反撃に打って出る可能性が大きいでしょう。こうなると、パレスチナ問題の暗転はもとより、戦乱が中東全域を巻き込む危険が生まれてきます。

特に、現在、アブドラ和平案を軸に久しぶりに中東諸国が結束しする気運が生まれています。それだけに、もしイラクが先制攻撃を受ければ、和平から反転し て、一部の中東諸国が団結して反米に回る可能性もあり得ないではないでしょう。これが、即ち第5次中東戦争となる危険です。

つまり、現 在アメリカは中東諸国の支持を取り付けてイラクを攻撃するためにイスラエルに圧力をかけていますが、この時点で停戦が実現したとしても、決して安心するこ とはできません。中東諸国の黙認を取り付けてイラク攻撃に出ても、以上のような展開を辿ることによって、結果的には「アメリカーイスラエル／イラクーパレ スチナー中東」という対決の構図が出来てしまう危険も否定できないのです。改めて言うまでもなく、これはハンチントンの言う「文明の衝突」の構図に他なり ません。

勿論、これはあくまでも「最悪シナリオ」に過ぎませんから、このような展開が現実になるとは限りませんし、むしろこのようにはならない可能性が高いと信じたいと思います。しかし、最悪の事態を想定するのは、私達の行動を考える上で有意義でしょう。

現に、アフガニスタン戦争の場合に述べた最悪シナリオも、決して無意味ではなく有意義だったと思います。前述のように、「アフガニスタン地上戦による泥沼 化→文明間戦争」という最悪シナリオは短期的にはとりあえず避けられたわけですが、中・長期的に見ると、再びその危険性が真実味を帯びてきたからです。最 悪シナリオを直視しつつ、そのシナリオの回避のために力を尽くすことこそ、私達の当為となるでしょう。

■９．被爆国家・日本の世界史的使命ーー絶対的反核の貫徹
アメリカは同時多発テロ事件を真珠湾攻撃や「カミカゼ特攻隊」にしばしば喩えてきました。そして、イラク・イラン・北朝鮮を「悪の枢軸」というように、第 2次世界戦争における「枢軸」、即ち日・独・伊に喩えました。そして、今回現れてきたのは、核行使の可能性です。勿論、原爆が実際に使われたのは、第2次 世界大戦の最後の局面で日本に対してであり、それ以来、冷戦期には、この悪魔の兵器は封印されてきたのでした。従って、核行使計画は、いわば対日戦最終段 階の原爆投下に喩えることができますし、広島・長崎への原爆以外には喩えることのできる事例は人類史上存在しないのです。

実際の規模は ともかくとして、ブッシュ大統領の頭の中では、「反『テロ』世界戦争＝第3次世界戦争」は、第2次世界戦争に喩えられているようであり、アルカイダ・タリ バンやフセインのイラクが、かつての日本に比定されているようです。それ故、この戦争の終結を核兵器によってもたらそうとしても、大統領の貧困な知性を考 えれば、それ自体は決して不思議ではありません。

広島・長崎の原爆投下についても、アメリカは、今なお米軍の犠牲者を減らすためには必 要だったとしており、その非人道性を認めていないことを想起する必要があるでしょう。この未決の問題が、ここにおいて現実の深刻な問題として姿を現しま す。イラク攻撃の地上戦において、「米軍の犠牲者を減らすためには原爆投下も止むなし」という論理が用いられる危険はないでしょうか。

「人種的な観点から、アメリカはドイツには原爆は落とさなかったが、日本には落とした」という見方があります。悲しいかな、イラクも非西洋のアジアの国であり、宗教もイスラームです。アメリカが、もう一度非人道的な殺戮行為を行わないという保証はないでしょう。

唯一の被爆国であり非核・平和国家たる戦後日本にとって、このような事態を回避すように最善を尽くすことが、国家の理念を賭けた至上命令であることは改めて言うまでもないでしょう。

戦前の日本の行為が思想的・現実的に全く許されないものであったのと同様に、フセインのイラクも決して望ましい国家ではないでしょう。しかし、戦前の日本 の行為にも拘わらず、原爆投下はやはり人類に対する罪であり、まして降伏直前の日本に対して米軍の犠牲者を減らすために原爆を投下して良いとは思えませ ん。戦後日本の絶対平和主義は、被爆体験を原点として生まれてきたのでした。

それ故、イラクの体制の如何を問わず、日本は核兵器の行使 に絶対反対の姿勢を断固として貫くべきです。アメリカが核攻撃の可能性を示唆した以上、日本がこの戦争に荷担することは決して許されません。これは、非核 国家の国是に反することであり、さらには原爆で逝った人々の苦しみを蔑ろにすることを意味します。日本の政治家にとって、核攻撃に加担することほど重い道 義的罪はないことを、知るべきでしょう。

「靖国の英霊」を祀る行為には、賛否両論があります。しかし、「広島・長崎の死者」の追悼は、 全国民に共通の感情でしょう。「広島・長崎の死者」は悼んで、イラクーーたとえばバグダットーーの死者を悼まないというのは、人道に反しています。全人類 においてそのような悲惨な事態が生じないように、「絶対的反核」を貫くことこそが、被爆国家・日本の世界史的使命に他なりません。

■１０．戦後日本公共哲学における絶対的当為ーーー絶対的公共悪に対する和戦
私自身はアフガニスタン戦争にも反対しましたが、結果倫理の観点からアメリカの限定攻撃に賛成ないし傍観する立場も、全く理解できないわけではありません。現在の日本における内外二重の恩顧主義的体制を考えれば、アメリカに追随したのも宜なるかな、という感もあります。

しかし、イラク攻撃、そしてそこに伴う核攻撃の危険を眼前にしては、もはやそのような逡巡の余地は、一切ないと言うべきでしょう。論説で「墨守」を主張し たように、通常の専守防衛ならば、日本も防衛力を行使する可能性はありますし、憲法をそのように解釈することも可能でしょう。さらに、それ以上の集団自衛 権を認めるかどうかという議論も、ーー賛否を別にすればーーなお理性的な議論として存在し得るでしょう。軍事力の行使も、状況によっては、不可避であるが 故に、ここまでの議論は理解できないわけではありません。

しかし、反核は、被爆国家・日本の国是であり、与野党を問わず、主要な政治家 で核保有や核行使を明確に主張した人はこれまで殆どいないはずです。従って、与野党を超えて、非核・反核を絶対の理念として、正々堂々とアメリカへの協力 を断るべきであり、日本政府はその核行使計画の非人道性を徹底的に批判すべきなのです。

弱腰の政府や外務省の内部ですら、日本の非核政 策との整合性を疑う声があるようです（資料８）。これを論理的に明確にして、日本はーー核攻撃の可能性をアメリカが留保している以上ーー断固としてイラク 戦には反対し、決して協力せずに中立主義を貫かなければなりません。万一、政府がアメリカに追随するようなら、国是を蔑ろにするような政府は断固打倒しな ければなりません。

繰り返しましょう。非核・反核は、被爆国家としての日本が、世界史的に担う絶対的理念であり、それ故に一切の妥協は 許されません。この絶対的理念を貫き世界に訴えることこそが、戦後日本の国家としての存在意義なのです。これこそが、国家としての世界史的・人類史的使命 でしょう。

現実の被爆体験に基づいて、イラク等に対する核行使に反対することは、世界の中で日本にしかできません。日本がその役割を果 たさなければ、どの国もそのような反対をすることはできないのです。広島の被爆者団体・反核団体や秋葉市長・長崎の市民団体が、一早く批判してブッシュ大 統領などに抗議文を送ったのは、当然であり、かつ、なすべき努めを果たしたということが出来るでしょう（資料２４－２６）。しかし、これらの抗議すら地方 紙（中国新聞）にしか報道されていない場合もあり、日本全国民が知り共に抗議するには到底至っていません。

イラクであれ、他の国であ れ、核を投下されれば、広島・長崎と同様の苦しみを人々が受けることになります。そのような悲惨な事態をみすみす許すことができましょうか？　アフガニス タン戦争とは違って、イラク攻撃には、最後まで賛成しない国や人々も多いはずです。それらの諸国や人々と声を合わせて、核戦争の危険に全力で反対すべきで す。仮に力及ばずして開戦を止めることが出来なくとも、せめてその罪に加担せずに反対を堅持して、少しでも早く終戦の日が来るように尽くすべきでしょう。

日本という国家が、過去の様々な過ちにも拘わらず、なお国家として存在し繁栄しうる意味は、何よりもまず絶対的反核の思想的・現実的拠点となるところにあ ると思うのです。広島・長崎だけではなく、日本全国民がアメリカに対して抗議の声を上げるべきであり、その下で政府が公式に抗議するべきなのです。アメリ カの核使用策定計画に激しく抗議し、核不拡散体制を遵守し強化するように強く働きかけなければなりません。

日本政府は、かつてインドと パキスタンの核実験を批判し、経済制裁を科しました。これは、非核の国是から見て正当な制裁でした。従って、今回は同様に、アメリカに対して正面から批判 を加え、その主導する反「テロ」世界戦争、ことにイラク戦に対して非協力の姿勢を宣明すべきです。

核行使は、いかなる理由をつけようと も、「絶対的公共悪」であり、「絶対的人類的悪」に他なりません。まして、イラク攻撃はそもそも必要性自体が極めて疑わしく、万一必要性があるとしても、 核行使の必然性は全くありません。米軍に犠牲は出るにしても、通常兵器でイラク軍を打倒することは間違いなく可能だからです。それにも拘わらず、核行使の 可能性を示唆するところに、ブッシュ政権の決定的な「邪悪さ」が現れています。

「朱に交われば赤くなる」という諺の通りに、邪悪な政権 の「友人」たることは、自らも「悪」に手を染めることです。非核国家・日本は、決して核行使という「人類的罪」に手を染めるべきではなく、その可能性を明 言している戦争に対しては、断固として協力を拒絶し反対を明言すべきです。

政治の世界には、様々な妥協や政治的考慮が必要であり、結果 倫理の観点から信条倫理を貫けないことも少なくはありません。しかし、核行使への拒絶こそは、およそあらゆるそのような現実的考慮を排し、断固として純粋 な信条倫理を貫くべき「絶対的当為」でしょう。信条倫理、そして定言命題の最後の砦でしょう。核行使反対こそは、被爆国家・日本にとって、国家としての存 在意義を賭して「和戦」を行うべき絶対的理念です。

「一寸の虫にも五分の魂」という諺も存在します。日本がこれまでいかに情けない随従 国家であっても、この一点にかけては、アメリカに対しても絶対的反対を貫く勇気を持っていること、その意味における「大和魂」が奮い起こされることを信じ たいと思います。このための戦いこそが、「和のための戦い」たる「和戦」に他なりません。日本の公共民が立ち上がり、「和戦」に勝利して、絶対的反核を世 界に訴え、日本が戦争に対して文明間中立主義を堅持することーーこれこそが、反核平和という戦後日本公共哲学の絶対的要請に他ならないでしょう。

このような「削減」が「まやかし」であることは明らかでしょう。要するに、アメリカ政府は、核削減計画も実質上中止し、核兵器を維持して、さらに先制核攻撃を可能にしようとしているのです。

上述した劣化ウラン兵器使用も、この文脈で捉えるべきでしょう。既に劣化ウランは湾岸戦争でも使われたようで、イラク政府は会議を主催したということです。

核問題と同様に信じがたいのは、「同時多発テロへの報復としてアフガンへ毒入り食料を供給せよ」という議論が政府部内で提起されていた（！）という暴露記 事です。さすがに、ライスーラムズフェルドですら反対して大統領には見せなかったということです（注１）が、「人道的援助」という美名の元になされた食料 投下の実体がよくわかります。これは決して「人道的援助」ではなく、戦争の勝利のための戦術的援助だったわけですが、場合によっては「非人道的援助」にな りかねなかったわけです。ちなみに、これは、ウォーターゲート事件報道で有名なボブ・ウッドワードらによる記事で、ワシントン・ポストであまり目立たない 形で報道されたそうです。

なお、「悪の枢軸（axis of evil）」は、スピーチ・ライターが書いた元々の原稿では「憎悪の枢軸(axis of hatred」であったようで、後にーー一説では大統領自身がーーより強い「悪の枢軸」に代えたようです(注２）。

（３）動向・批判
このようなアメリカの信じがたい帝国主義的政策に対して、世界的に健全な批判が現れ始めています。イギリス内部でも世論の批判が高まってきています。驚く べきことに、ブレア首相は、あくまでアメリカに追従してイラク攻撃に協力しようという姿勢を見せていますが、そのような愚策を強行すれば、次期総選挙で敗 北する可能性が高まってきました。これでも強行する気でしょうか？

同時多発テロ以来、アメリカについて、権益目的の指摘を始め様々な陰 謀説が流れています。これらの中には荒唐無稽なものもあり、確認できないものがほとんどなので、これまで情報を流しませんでした。しかし、逆に無視できな いような情報も中には存在するので、参考までに（注３）を付します。ご関心のある方は、ご検討の上取捨選択して下さい。

注１： http://journal.msn.co.jp/articles/nartist2.asp?w=127329
「アフガンへ毒入り食料を供給せよ」ワシントンポストがしり込みした暴露記事（スコット・シュガー、Slate）
2002年3月8日

注２： http://journal.msn.co.jp/articles/nartist2.asp?w=125465
「悪の枢軸」は本来、「憎悪の枢軸」だった (ティモシー・ノア、Slate)
2002年3月4日

資料１５：
http://www.globalsecurity.org/index.html　（トップ・ページ）
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm

Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts]
Submitted to Congress on 31 December 2001.
8 January 2002
Nuclear Posture Review Report
Foreword
The Congress directed the Defense Department to conduct a comprehensive Nuclear Posture Review to lay out the direction for American nuclear forces over the next five to ten years. The Department has completed that review and prepared the attached report.
Early on, we recognized that the new security environment demanded that the Department go beyond the Congressional mandate in developing a strategic posture for the 21st century. President Bush had already directed the Defense Department to transform America’s military and prepare it for the new, unpredictable world in which we will be living. The result of his direction is the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Building on the (QDR) this Nuclear Posture Review puts in motion a major change in our approach to the role of nuclear offensive forces in our deterrent strategy and presents the blueprint for transforming our strategic posture.

This report establishes a New Triad, composed of:

Offensive strike systems (both nuclear and non-nuclear);

Defenses (both active and passive); and

A revitalized defense infrastructure that will provide new capabilities in a timely fashion to meet emerging threats.

This New Triad is bound together by enhanced command and control (C2) and intelligence systems.
The establishment of this New Triad can both reduce our dependence on nuclear weapons and improve our ability to deter attack in the face of proliferating WMD capabilities in two ways:

The addition of defenses (along with the prospects for timely adjustments to force capabilities and enhanced C2 and intelligence systems) means that the U.S. will no longer be as heavily dependent on offensive strike forces to enforce deterrence as it was during the Cold War.

The addition of non-nuclear strike forces–including conventional strike and information operations–means that the U.S. will be less dependent than it has been in the past on nuclear forces to provide its offensive deterrent capability.

The combination of new capabilities that make up the New Triad reduce the risk to the nation as it draws its nuclear forces toward the goal of 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads announced by President Bush on November 13, 2001.
The following is a summary of the highlights in this report.

First and foremost, the Nuclear Posture Review puts the Cold War practices related to planning for strategic forces behind us. In the decade since the collapse of the Soviet Union, planning for the employment of U.S. nuclear forces has undergone only modest revision, despite the new relationship between the U.S. and Russia. Few changes had been made to the size or composition of the strategic nuclear force beyond those required by the START Treaty. At the same time, plans and funding for sustaining some critical elements of that force have been inadequate.

As a result of this review, the U.S. will no longer plan, size or sustain its forces as though Russia presented merely a smaller version of the threat posed by the former Soviet Union. Following the direction laid down for U.S. defense planning in the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review shifts planning for America’s strategic forces from the threat-based approach of the Cold War to a capabilities-based approach. This new approach should provide, over the coming decades, a credible deterrent at the lowest level of nuclear weapons consistent with U.S. and allied security.

Second, we have concluded that a strategic posture that relies solely on offensive nuclear forces is inappropriate for deterring the potential adversaries we will face in the 21st century. Terrorists or rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction will likely test America’s security commitments to its allies and friends. In response, we will need a range of capabilities to assure friend and foe alike of U.S. resolve. A broader array of capability is needed to dissuade states from undertaking political, military, or technical courses of action that would threaten U.S. and allied security. U.S. forces must pose a credible deterrent to potential adversaries who have access to modern military technology, including NBC weapons and the means to deliver them over long distances. Finally, U.S. strategic forces need to provide the President with a range of options to defeat any aggressor.

To meet the nation’s defense goals in the 21st century, the first leg of the New Triad, the offensive strike leg, will go beyond the Cold War triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range nuclear-armed bombers. ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers and nuclear weapons will, of course, continue to play a vital role. However, they will be just part of the first leg of the New Triad, integrated with new non-nuclear strategic capabilities that strengthen the credibility of our offensive deterrence.

The second leg of the New Triad requires development and deployment of both active and passive defenses–a recognition that offensive capabilities alone may not deter aggression in the new security environment of the 21st century. The events of September 11, 2001 underscore this reality. Active and passive defenses will not be perfect. However, by denying or reducing the effectiveness of limited attacks, defenses can discourage attacks, provide new capabilities for managing crises, and provide insurance against the failure of traditional deterrence.

The third leg of the New Triad is a responsive defense infrastructure. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. defense infrastructure has contracted and our nuclear infrastructure has atrophied. New approaches to development and procurement of new capabilities are being designed so that it will not take 20 years or more to field new generations of weapon systems. With respect to the nuclear infrastructure, it needs to be repaired to increase confidence in the deployed forces, eliminate unneeded weapons, and mitigate the risks of technological surprise. Maintaining our ability to respond to large strategic changes can permit us to reduce our nuclear arsenal and, at the same time, dissuade adversaries from starting a competition in nuclear armaments.

The effectiveness of this New Triad depends upon command and control, intelligence, and adaptive planning. “Exquisite” intelligence on the intentions and capabilities of adversaries can permit timely adjustments to the force and improve the precision with which it can strike and defend. The ability to plan the employment of the strike and defense forces flexibly and rapidly will provide the U.S. with a significant advantage in managing crises, deterring attack and conducting military operations.

Constructing the New Triad, reducing our deployed nuclear weapons, and increasing flexibility in our strategic posture has resource implications. It costs money to retire old weapons systems and create new capabilities. Restoring the defense infrastructure, developing and deploying strategic defenses, improving our command and control, intelligence, planning, and non-nuclear strike capabilities require new defense initiatives and investments. However, these investments can make the U.S. more secure while reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons.

The Quadrennial Defense Review established the foundation for America’s post-Cold War defense strategy. Building on the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review will transform the Cold War era offensive nuclear triad into a New Triad designed for the decades to come.

Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense

——————————————————————————–

Body of the Report
“Nuclear weapons play a critical role in the defense capabilities of the United States, its allies and friends. They provide credible military options to deter a wide range of threats, including WMD and large-scale conventional military force. These nuclear capabilities possess unique properties that give the United States options to hold at risk classes of targets [that are] important to achieve strategic and political objectives.” (p. 7)

However, “U.S. nuclear forces, alone are unsuited to most of the contingencies for which the United States prepares. The United States and allied interests may not require nuclear strikes.” A “new mix” of nuclear, non-nuclear, and defensive capabilities “is required for the diverse set of potential adversaries and unexpected threats the United States may confront in the coming decades.” (p. 7)

“Greater flexibility is needed with respect to nuclear forces and planning than was the case during the Cold War. The assets most valued by the spectrum of potential adversaries in the new security environment may be diverse and, in some cases, U.S. understanding of what an adversary values may evolve. Consequently, although the number of weapons needed to hold those assets at risk has declined, U.S. nuclear forces still require the capability to hold at risk a wide range of target types. This capability is key to the role of nuclear forces in supporting an effective deterrence strategy relative to a broad spectrum of potential opponents under a variety of contingencies. Nuclear attack options that vary in scale, scope, and purpose will complement other military capabilities. The combination can provide the range of options needed to pose a credible deterrent to adversaries whose values and calculations of risk and of gain and loss may be very different from and more difficu!
lt to discern than those of past adversaries.” (p. 7)

“Advances in defensive technologies will allow U.S. non-nuclear and nuclear capabilities to be coupled with active and passive defenses to help provide deterrence and protection against attack, preserve U.S. freedom of action, and strengthen the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments. ” (p. 7)

“Missile defenses are beginning to emerge as systems that can have an effect on the strategic and operational calculations of potential adversaries. They are now capable of providing, active defense against short- to medium-range threats.” (p. 11)

U.S. military forces themselves, including nuclear forces will now be used to “dissuade adversaries from undertaking military programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of allies and friends.” (p. 9)

“Defensive systems capable of intercepting ballistic missiles may reduce the need for nuclear weapons to hold at risk an adversary’s missile launchers.” (p. 9)

“A modern, responsive nuclear weapons sector of the infrastructure is indispensable, especially as the size of the operationally deployed nuclear arsenal is reduced.” (p. 10-11)

“The planning process [for the New Triad] not only must produce a variety of flexible, pre-planned non-nuclear and nuclear options, but also incorporate sufficient adaptability to support the timely construction of additional options in a crisis or unexpected conflict.” (p. 11)

II. “CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE NEW TRIAD TO DEFENSE POLICY GOALS” (p.12)
(Assure, Dissuade, Deter, Defeat)
“ASSURE” ?“U.S. nuclear forces will continue to provide assurance to security partners, particularly in the presence of known or suspected threats of nuclear, biological, or chemical attacks or in the event of surprising military developments. This assurance can serve to reduce the incentives for friendly countries to acquire nuclear weapons of their own to deter such threats and circumstances. Nuclear capabilities also assure the U.S. public that the United States will not be subject to coercion based on a false perception of U.S. weakness among potential adversaries. (p. 12)

“Defense of the U.S. homeland and protection of forward bases increase the ability of the United States to counteract WMD-backed coercive threats and to use its power projection forces in the defense of allies and friends.” (p. 13)

“DISSUADE” ? “Systems capable of striking a wide range of targets throughout an adversary’s territory may dissuade a potential adversary from pursuing threatening capabilities. For example, a demonstration of the linkage between long-range precision strike weapons and real-time intelligence systems may dissuade a potential adversary from investing heavily in mobile ballistic missiles.” (p. 12)

“Defenses can make it more arduous and costly for an adversary to compete militarily with or wage war against the United States. The demonstration of a range of technologies and systems for missile defense can have a dissuasive effect on potential adversaries. The problem of countering missile defenses, especially defensive systems with multiple layers, presents a potential adversary with the prospect of a difficult, time-consuming and expensive undertaking.” (p. 13)

“The capacity of the infrastructure to upgrade existing weapon systems, surge production of weapons, or develop and field entirely new systems for the New Triad can discourage other countries from competing militarily with the United States.” (p. 14)

“DETER” ? “[Missile] [D]efense of U.S. territory and power projection forces, including U.S forces abroad, combined with the certainty of U.S. ability to strike in response, can bring into better balance U.S. stakes and risks in a regional confrontation and thus reinforce the credibility of U. S. guarantees designed to deter attacks on allies and friends.”

“The [defense R&D and industrial] infrastructure must provide confidence in the reliability of the nuclear stockpile and the ability of command and control structures to withstand attack. More broadly, [it] helps to enhance deterrence of aggression by supporting improved U.S. capabilities to hold at risk high-value targets in the face of an adversary’s efforts to conceal, harden, and disperse them.” (p. 14)

“DEFEAT” ? “Composed of both non-nuclear systems and nuclear weapons, the strike element of the New Triad can provide greater flexibility in the design and conduct of military campaigns to defeat opponents decisively. Non-nuclear strike capabilities may be particularly useful to limit collateral damage and conflict escalation. Nuclear weapons could be employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack, (for example, deep underground bunkers or bio-weapon facilities).” (p. 12-13)

“Missile defenses could defeat small-scale missile attacks intended to coerce the United States into abandoning an embattled ally or friend. Defenses that provided protection for strike capabilities of the New Triad and for other power projection forces would improve the ability of the United States and its allies and friends to counterattack an enemy. They may also provide the President with an option to manage a crisis involving one or more missile and WMD-armed opponents.” (p. 13)

COMMAND, CONTROL, PLANNING, AND INTELLIGENCE (p. 15)
“As forces are incrementally changed to meet the New Triad force requirements, command and control (C2) becomes more critical to ensure the effectiveness of the elements of the residual force structure… Strike options will require intricate planning, flexibility, and interface with decision makers throughout the engagement process. Command and control will become more complex and the supporting systems and platforms will require augmentation, modernization, and replacement.” (p. 15)

“Accurate and timely targeting information can increase both the lethality of strike capabilities and the possibilities for non-nuclear strike capabilities to substitute for nuclear weapons or provide for the timely positioning of missile defense assets.” (p. 15)

DEFENSE POLICY GOALS AND RELATED NUCLEAR WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS (p. 15)
“In a fluid security environment, the precise nuclear force level necessary for the future cannot be predicted with certainty. The goal of reducing, over the next decade, the U.S. operationally deployed strategic nuclear force to the range of between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads provides a degree of flexibility necessary to accommodate changes in the security environment that could affect U.S. nuclear requirements.” (p. 15)

SIZING THE NUCLEAR F0RCE (p. 16)
“In setting requirements for nuclear strike capabilities, distinctions can be made among the contingencies for which the United States must be prepared. Contingencies can be categorized as immediate, potential or unexpected.”

“Immediate contingencies involve well-recognized current dangers… Current examples of immediate contingencies include an Iraqi attack on Israel or its neighbors, a North Korean attack on South Korea, or a military confrontation over the status of Taiwan.”

“Potential contingencies are plausible, but not immediate dangers. For example, the emergence of a new, hostile military coalition against the United States or its allies in which one or more members possesses WMD and the means of delivery is a potential contingency that could have major consequences for U.S. defense planning, including plans for nuclear forces.” (p. 16)

Unexpected contingencies are sudden and unpredicted security challenges,” like the Cuban Missile Crisis. “Contemporary illustrations might include a sudden regime change by which an existing nuclear arsenal comes into the hands of a new, hostile leadership group, or an opponents surprise unveiling of WMD capabilities.” Ibid.

‘North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya are among the countries that could be involved in immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies. All have longstanding hostility toward the United States and its security partners; North Korea and Iraq in particular have been chronic military concerns. All sponsor or harbor terrorists, and all have active WMD and missile programs.” Ibid

“Due to the combination of China’s still developing strategic objectives and its ongoing modernization of its nuclear and non nuclear forces, China is a country that could be involved in an immediate or potential contingency.” (p. 16-17)

“Russia maintains the most formidable nuclear forces, aside from the United States, and substantial, if less impressive, conventional capabilities. There now are, however, no ideological sources of conflict with Moscow, as there were during the Cold War. The United States seeks a more cooperative relationship with Russia and a move away from the balance-of-terror policy framework, which by definition is an expression of mutual distrust and hostility. As a. result, a [nuclear strike] contingency involving Russia, while plausible, is not expected.” (p. 17)

(U) “Adjusting U.S. immediate nuclear force requirements in recognition of the changed relationship with Russia is a critical step away from the Cold War policy of mutual vulnerability and toward more cooperative relations.” (p. 17)

(S) “Russia’s nuclear forces and programs, nevertheless, remain a concern. Russia faces many strategic problems around its periphery and its future course cannot be charted with certainty. U.S. planning must take this into account. In the event that U.S. relations with Russia significantly worsen in the future, the U.S. may need to revise its nuclear force levels and posture.” (p. 17)

OPERATIONALLY DEPLOYED AND RESPONSIVE NUCLEAR FORCES
“The operationally deployed forces are sized to provide the capabilities required to meet the U.S. defense goals in the context of immediate, and unexpected contingencies. That is, a sufficient number of forces must be available on short notice to counter known threats while preserving a small, additional margin in the event of a surprise development. The 1700-2200 warheads the United States is scheduled to deploy in 2012 would constitute the operationally deployed force.” (p. 17)

“The responsive force is intended to provide a capability to augment the operationally deployed force to meet potential contingencies … The responsive force … retains the option for leadership to increase the number of operationally delayed forces in proportion to the severity of an evolving crisis. A responsive force need not be available in a matter of days, but in weeks, months, or even years. For example, additional bombs could be brought out of the non-deployed stockpile in days or weeks. By contrast, adding additional weapons to the ICBM force could take as long as a year for a squadron in a wing. The responsive force [also] provides a reserve from which replacements can be provided for operationally deployed weapons that evidence reliability problems.”

US NUCLEAR FORCE SIZE
“Based on current projections, an operationally deployed force of 1700-2200 strategic nuclear warheads by 2012 …will support U.S. deterrence policy to hold at risk what opponents value, including their instruments of political control and military power, and to deny opponents their war aims. The types of targets to be held at risk for deterrence purposes include leadership and military capabilities, particularly WMD, military command facilities and other centers of control and infrastructure that support military forces.”

“The planned force structure for 2012 comprises 14 Trident SSBNs (with two of the 14 in overhaul at any time) 500 Minuteman III ICBMs, 76 B-52H bombers, and 21 B-2 bombers.”

THE PATH FOR NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS
“A conceptual path toward an operationally deployed force of 1,700-2,200 warheads in 2012 … eliminates Peacekeeper ICBMs, removes 4 Trident SSBNs from strategic service, and downloads weapons from Trident SLBMs, Minuteman III ICBMs; and B-52H and B-2 bombers. This will result in 3,800 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by 2007 (SLBM warheads for SSBNs in overhaul will not be counted as operationally deployed because those submarines are unavailable for alert patrols).” (p. 19)

“Subsequent reductions below the 3,800 operationally deployed warheads can be achieved through a variety of methods. The precise method will be determined in the course of periodic reviews the Department will conduct beginning in 2003. The Secretary of Defense will direct that these reviews be undertaken with the participation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commander in Chief of U.S. Strategic Forces Command, and the NNSA Administrator.” (p. 19)

III. CREATING THE NEW TRIAD
“To meet the demands of the New Triad, an overhaul of existing capabilities is needed. This includes improving the tools used to build and execute strike plans so that the national leadership can adapt pre-planned options, or construct new options, during highly dynamic crisis situations.” (p. 23)

“In addition, the technology base and production readiness infrastructures of both DoD and NNSA must be modernized so that the United States will be able to adjust to rapidly changing situations ….adjustments may be needed to match capabilities of the remaining nuclear forces to new missions… a need may arise to modify, upgrade, or replace portions of the extant nuclear force or develop concepts for follow-on nuclear weapons better suited is the nation’s needs. It is unlikely that a reduced version of the Cold War nuclear arsenal will be precisely the nuclear force that the United States will require in 2012 and beyond.” (p. 23)

“The FY04 DPG [Defense Planning Guidance] will provide guidance to coordinate and deconflict requirements for nuclear and non nuclear systems.” (p. 24)

“Initiatives reflected in the proposed FY03-07 Future Years Defense Plan (FYPD) include:

Mobile and Relocatable Targets. DoD proposed to develop a systems-level approach, applied across the Services, for holding at risk critical mobile targets.
Defeating Hard and Deeply-Buried Targets. DoD would implement a program to improve significantly the means to locate, identify, characterize, and target adversarial hard and deeply buried targets.
Long Range Strike. DoD will pursue a systems level approach to defeat critical fixed and mobile targets at varying ranges, in all terrain and weather conditions, and in denied areas.
Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs). DoD has proposed to fund the conversion of four SSBNs, withdrawn from the strategic nuclear service, to SSGN configuration.
Precision Strike. Effort to increase the number of targets than can be attacked on a single mission. Elements include a “Multifunction Information Distribution System” to provide “a jam-resistant, secure, digital network for exchange of critical information for strike capabilities,” a “Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile,” A “Small Diameter Bomb,” and the “Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle.”
New Strike System. “DoD will begin in FY03 to explore concepts for a new strike system that might arm the converted SSGNs. Desired capabilities for this new strike weapon include timely arrival on target, precision, and the ability to be retargeted rapidly.” (p. 24-25)
Ballistic Missile Defense
“The President has stated that the mission for missile defense is to protect all 50 states, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies against ballistic missile attacks. The Department has rerganized its ballistic missile defense program. The program is pursuing missile defense based an the following guidance:

Missile defense is most effective if it is layered; that is, able to intercept ballistic missiles of any range in all phases of their flight.
The United States seeks effective defenses against attacks by small numbers of longer range missiles as well as defenses against attacks by larger numbers of short- and medium-range missiles.
Missile defense systems, like all military systems, can be less than 100-percent effective and still make a significant contribution to security by enhancing deterrence and saving lives if deterrence fails.” (p. 25)
“Other than the PAC-3, the United States has not yet chosen systems for deployment; that decision will depend on the evolution of both technology and the threat. The Department is exploring a wide range of alternative approaches. There are two dimensions to the missile defense program: near-term emergency capabilities; and improved variants of these capabilities leading to more robust, operational systems. Several near-term and mid-term options (2003-2008) that could provide an emergency missile defense capability are under consideration, including:

A single Airborne Laser for boost-phase intercepts may be available for limited operations against ballistic missiles of all ranges;
A rudimentary ground-based midcourse system, consisting of a small number of interceptors taken from the test program and an upgraded Cobra Dane radar in Alaska, could be available against longer-range threats to the United States; and
A sea-based Aegis system could be available to provide rudimentary midcourse capability against short to medium-range threats.” (p. 26)
“Based on the technical progress of these systems, the United States could deploy operational capabilities beginning in the 2006-2008 period including:

2-3 Airborne Laser aircraft
Additional ground-based midcourse sites
4 sea-based midcourse ships
terminal systems, able to defend against shorter range threats: PAC-3, which began deployment in 2001, and THAAD, which could be available by 2008.” (p. 26)
“DOD will develop the low-orbit constellation of SBIRS-Low satellites to support missile defense. This system will provide capabilities to track enemy ballistic missiles and to assist in the discrimination of reentry vehicles and other objects in flight.” (p. 28)

Command and Control Intelligence

[the Secretary of Defense] “established a Federal Advisory Committee (FAC) to conduct an independent, end-to-end review of all activities involved in maintaining the highest standards of nuclear weapons safety, security, control, and reliability.” This “End-to-End Review” was conducted concurrently with the NPR but was not completed before the NPR deadline. While the review is not yet final, the FAC presented an “urgent preliminary finding to the Secretary subsequent to the events of September 11 identifying the need to expand the current nuclear command and control (C2) architecture to a true national command and control conferencing system.” (p. 26)

“The attacks of September 11 dramatically highlighted the requirement for secure, wideband communications between fixed and mobile command centers and national decision makers. The Department is developing a secure wideband communications architecture and procedures … The Department will initiate a satellite communications system in FY03, the Advanced Wideband System (AWS), that incorporates interoperable laser communications and will be designed to meet the needs of the defense and intelligence community for wideband tactical, protected tactical (replaces Advanced EHF satellites) broadcast, and relay communications with a planned system first launch during FY09. The Department supports the effort to implement a secure, wideband capability on all strategic C2 platforms. Wideband complements, but does not replace, the requirement for assured, survivable, and enduring nuclear C2.” (p. 27)

The “2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States” provided immediate upgrades to aircraft for national leadership, and the Department has programmed funding for additional wideband upgrades including the E-4 National Airborne Operations Center aircraft.

“Three Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) spacecraft are planned for an initial operating capability of FY08 that will provide nuclear-survivable (e.g. against high altitude electromagnetic pulse), anti-jam, low and medium data rate communications to strategic and tactical users.”

“The Department will initiate in FY03 an Extremely High Frequency (EHF) communications satellites program primarily for national and strategic users requiring nuclear protected communications in the mid-latitude and polar regions with a planned first launch during FY09. Survivable, jam-resistant, secure voice conferencing among principal nuclear C2 decision makers remains essential to facilitate discussions of tactical warning and assessment, response options, and force management.” (p. 27)

“… substantial investment in nuclear C2 cryptographic systems … new nuclear C2 capabilities must be leveraged with new technologies. (p. 27)

Intelligence

“Significant capability shortfalls currently exist in: finding and tracking mobile and relocatable targets and WMD sites: locating, identifying, and characterizing hard and deeply buried targets (HDBTs); [and] providing intelligence support to Information Operations and federated intelligence operations ” (p. 28)

“To provide continuous and persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of critical regions, the Department proposes to develop in its FY03-07 FYDP a “system of systems that consists of space, airborne, surface, and subsurface capabilities. Sensors for this system will include a mix of phenomenology, allow for agile and flexible response, and operate across the electro-magnetic spectrum.” (p. 28)

“New concepts for persistent surveillance – from air- and space-based platforms – including hyper-spectral imaging, are proposed in the FY03 budget. (ibid).

“Intelligence for Information Operations (IO). Information Operations targeting, weaponeering, and execution requires intelligence collection of finer granularity and depth than is currently available. The intelligence community lacks adequate data on most adversary computer local area networks and other command and control systems. Additionally, there is limited analytical capability to exploit these networks using IO tools. Investments must continue in order to upgrade and, populate the Modernized Integrated Database to enable effective IO targeting, weaponeering, and combat assessment essential to the New Triad.”

Adaptive Planning (p. 29)
“The current nuclear planning system, including target identification, weapons system assignment, and the nuclear command and control system requirements, is optimized to support large, deliberately planned nuclear strikes. In the future, as the nation moves beyond the concept of a large, Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and moves toward more flexibility, adaptive planning will play a much larger role.”

“Deliberate planning creates executable war plans, prepared in advance, for anticipated contingencies. Adaptive planning is used to generate war plans quickly in time critical-situations. Deliberate planning provides the foundation for adaptive planning by identifying individual weapon/target combinations that could be executed in crises.”

“For contingencies for which no adaptive planning has been done, fully adaptive planning will be required. The desire to shorten the time between identifying a target and having an option available will place significant stress on the nuclear planning process as it currently exists. Presently 12-48 hours is required to develop a plan to attack a single new target, depending on the weapon system to be employed. A more flexible planning system is needed to address the requirements of adaptive planning.”

“To make the Strategic Warfare Planning System (SWPS) more responsive to adaptive planning scenarios, a comprehensive SWPS Transformation Study has been initiated and is being conducted by U.S. Strategic Command. Results will be available in late spring 2002. To meet the requirements of adaptive planning, an upgrade of the existing nuclear C2 architecture is needed.

DOD Infrastructure Issues
“DOD has identified shortfalls in current infrastructure sustainment programs far nuclear platforms. These include the following: solid rocket motor design, development and testing; technology for current and future strategic systems; improved surveillance and assessment capabilities; command and control platforms and systems; and design, development, and production of radiation-hardened parts.” (p. 30)

“In support of this effort, the Defense Science Board Task Force on System Technology for the Future US Strategic Posture is considering strategies for enhancing the ability of the U.S. technology base to deal with or hedge against uncertainties in the nature and timing of potential strategic threats, the capability of the technology and industrial base to respond in a timely manner, and the adequacy and responsiveness of science and technology programs related to possible future strategic capabilities. In addition, the U.S. Strategic Command Advisory Group on Strategic Platforms is addressing weapon system viability arid nuclear force readiness.” (p. 30)

The Current U.S. Nuclear Warhead Infrastructure
“Underinvestment in the infrastructure – in particular the production complex – has increased the risks that if substantial problems in the stockpile are discovered, future options to refurbish or replace existing designs will be limited. For example, although an interim pit production capability will be established later in this decade, no current capability exists to build and certify plutonium pits, certain secondary components, or complete warheads.” (p. 30)

“The need is clear for a revitalized nuclear weapons complex that will: …be able, if directed, to design, develop, manufacture, and certify new warheads in response to new national requirements; and maintain readiness to resume underground nuclear testing if required.” (p. 30)

Stockpile Maintenance
“DOD and NNSA are in the preliminary stages of determining the requirements for nuclear warheads for the New Triad. As the New Triad is developed and fielded, DoD and NNSA will have to reassess how the warheads in the stockpile are characterized. At present, the warhead stockpile is divided into two categories: active and inactive:

Active stock pile warheads are maintained in a ready-for-use configuration with tritium and other limited life components installed. They incorporate the latest warhead modifications. The active stockpile includes all deployed warheads, warheads for the responsive force, and logistics spares for each warhead type.
Inactive stockpile warheads do not have limited life components installed, and may not have the latest warhead modifications. These warheads serve a number of purposes ranging from reliability replacements that act as a hedge against the discovery of a problem with a large number of active warheads, to the more predictable replacement of warheads consumed by quality assurance and reliability testing. This hedge is required because the United States will not have, for a decade or more, the capacity to produce certain new components for warheads. The time it would take to deploy warheads in the inactive stockpile depends on the delivery system, and availability of tritium gas and other limited-life components. These warheads or their components could also be used to provide new capabilities. This time would range from weeks in the case of bombers, to years in the case of ICBMs.” (p. 31-32)
“There are almost 8,000 warheads in the active stockpile today. As the initial nuclear warhead reductions are implemented, some warheads will be transferred from the active to the inactive stockpile. For example, the removal from strategic service of the 4 SSBNs will result in the transfer of over 700 W76 warheads to the inactive stockpile. By 2012 approximately 3,000 warheads, now in the active stockpile, are planned to be transferred to the inactive stockpile or retired.” (p. 32)

“Some of the W87 Peacekeeper warheads will be redeployed on Minuteman ICBMs under the Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle (SERV) program Each W87 warhead will displace one W62, or three W78 warheads currently deployed on Minuteman. To provide warhead diversity in the force, some SERV-modified Minuteman missiles would carry the W78 warhead. A number of W78 and W87 warheads will be retained as reliability replacements and surveillance assets to support the responsive force. In addition, the W62 will be retired by the end of Fiscal Year 2009. (p. 32)

“The active stockpiles also includes the nonstrategic nuclear weapons.”

“The United States will retain an inactive stockpile of nuclear weapons. The size of that stockpile is yet to be determined. It will be driven by the capacity of the nuclear weapon complex to refurbish and dismantle weapons. For example, today the complex can process – either refurbish or dismantle – roughly 350 weapons per year. If the NNSA’s proposed plan is funded, that number should increase to roughly 600 per year.” (p. 32)

“A major challenge for nuclear weapons programs over the next two decades will be to refurbish, and thereby extend the life of, at least seven types of nuclear warheads” [a table lists these as B61 -3, 4, 10; B61-7, 11; W76; W78; W80-0, 1; B83-0; B83-1; W87; and W88.]

Restoring Production Infrastructure
“Warhead Assembly and Disassembly:…Plans are underway to expand the capacity and capability of the Pantex Plant to meet the planned workload for dismantlement and remanufacturing of existing weapons.” (p. 33)

“Uranium Operations: At least seven to eight years of effort will be required to restore the capability to produce a complete nuclear weapon secondary at the Y-12 Plant in Tennessee. Qualified processes for some material and manufacturing steps are not currently in place. Plans are underway to expand the capacity and capability of the Y-12 Plant to meet the planned workload for replacing warhead secondaries, and other uranium components.” (p. 33)

“Plutonium Operations: One glaring shortfall is the inability to fabricate and certify weapon primaries, or so-called “pits”. Work is underway to establish an interim capability at Los Alamos National Laboratory late in this decade to meet current demand created by destructive surveillance testing on the W88 warhead. For the long term a new modern production facility will be needed to deal with the large-scale replacement of components and new production.” (p. 33)

“Other Component and Material Production:… Tritium production, halted since 1988, is programmed to resume in FY03 with first deliveries to the stockpile scheduled for FY06. Additionally, warhead refurbishment plans require modern facilities at Y-12’s Special Materials Complex for manufacturing unique materials.” (p. 14)

NNSA Initiatives for Nuclear Weapons Programs
“As a result of the NPR, NNSA will undertake several initiatives…

Advanced Concepts Initiative:…There are several nuclear weapon options that might provide important advantages for enhancing the nation’s deterrence posture: possible modifications to existing weapons to provide additional yield flexibility in the stockpile; improved earth penetrating weapons (EPWs) to counter the increased use by potential adversaries of hardened and deeply buried facilities; and warheads that reduce collateral damage. (p. 34-35)

“To further assess these and other nuclear weapons options in connection with meeting new or emerging military requirements, the NNSA will reestablish advanced warhead concepts teams at each of the national laboratories and at headquarters in Washington. This will provide unique opportunities to train our next generation of weapon designers and engineers. DoD and NNSA will also jointly review potential programs to provide nuclear capabilities, and identify opportunities for further study, including assessments of whether nuclear testing would be required to field such warheads.” (p. 35)

“The [Feb. 2001 Foster] Panel recommendation that DOE/NNSA assess the feasibility and cost of reducing the time [to resume testing] to ‘well below the Congressionally-mandated one year’ (sense of the Congress as expressed in the 1996 Resolution of Ratification for the START II Treaty) was addressed as part of the NPR.” (p. 35)

“Test Readiness is maintained principally by the participation of nuclear test program personnel in an active program of stockpile stewardship experiments carried out underground at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). There are two concerns about the current test readiness program.”

“First, … the current 2-3 year test readiness posture will not be sustainable as more and more experienced test personnel retire. Not all of the techniques and processes required to carry out underground nuclear tests – including nuclear diagnostic instrumentation, containment, design and emplacement of diagnostic equipment in a vertical shaft, drillback and radiochemical analysis are exercised with the subcritical experimentation work carried out a the NTS. As experienced personnel retire, it will become more difficult to train new people in these techniques, further degrading test readiness. This argues for an approach in which all key capabilities required to conduct underground nuclear tests are identified and exercised on projects making use of a variety of nuclear testing related skills.” (p. 35-36)

“Second, the 2-3 year posture may be too long to address any serious defect that might be discovered in the future.”

“Given the certainty of surprise in the future and the broad spectrum of threats, the United States also must have the capability to understand the technological implications of nuclear weapon concepts and countermeasures tested by other states, to ensure that U.S. weapons and delivery platforms (including advanced conventional strike systems) perform effectively. If necessary, this will enable the United States to initiate research into whether it needs to develop an entirely new capability – one that it not a modification of an existing weapon – in time to address the threat.” (p. 36)

“To address these concerns… NNSA proposes over the next three years to enhance test readiness by: augmenting key personnel and increasing their operational proficiency; beginning the mentoring of the next generation of testing personnel; conducting additional field experiments including additional subcritical experiments and test related exercises of appropriate fidelity; replacing key underground-test-unique components (e.g. Field Test Neutron Generators); modernizing certain test diagnostic capabilities; and decreasing the time required to show regulatory and safety compliance. DoD and NNSA will work to refine test scenarios and evaluate cost/benefit tradeoffs in order to determine, implement, and sustain the optimum test readiness time chat best supports the New Triad.” (p. 36)

Meeting Warhead Production Commitments to DoD . …A key capability that must be recovered is manufacture of plutonium pits. In addition to our efforts to establish a limited production capability at Los Alamos, NNSA will accelerate preliminary design work on a modern pit manufacturing facility so that new production capacity can be brought on line when it is needed.” (p. 36)

People with Critical Skills
The DoD and NNSA will jointly support opportunities that provide end-to-end demonstration of integrated capabilities involved with warhead design, development, manufacturing, and warhead/weapon integration. A key objective is to exercise critical skills for adapting warheads to DoD weapon delivery systems; …NNSA will include the following as goals for the new Advanced Concepts Initiative:

Transfer of warhead design knowledge from the current generation of designers to the next generation
Exercise of DoD/NNSA program integration skills.
Nuclear Force Sustainment and Modernization
“No plans to phase-out [dual-capable] F-15E; Phase-out F-16 once dual-capable JSF is deployed.”

[Concerning ICBMs] “The focus of the Department’s efforts are to extend the life of the MM III weapons system until 2020 while beginning the requirements process for the next-generation ICBM”

A comprehensive set of sustainment programs are planned or underway:

Guidance Replacement Program (GRP)
Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP)
Propulsion System Rocket Engine (PSRE) life extension program (“replaces aging components in the post-boost vehicle”)
Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting (REACT) service life extension program
Environmental Control System (ECS)
Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle (SERV) program.
“The SERV program reconfigures the MM III ICBM to carry the Mk21 reentry vehicle which is currently deployed on Peacekeeper missiles.” (p. 41)

“Peacekeeper deactivation will occur over a 36-month period [beginning in FY03] with missiles remaining on alert and fully mission capable throughout the deactivation period. …The Department analyzed the role of the Peacekeeper against projected threats in the post-Cold War environment and judged that its retirement would not have an adverse effect on the sufficiency of U.S. nuclear forces. DoD plans to retain the booster stages for potential future uses such as space launch or target vehicles.” (p. 41)

“Follow on ICBM: The Air Force Systems Command (AFSPC) led the Ballistic Missile Requirements (BMR) Study (1998 to 2000) which documented a number of needs beyond the current baseline ICBM mission, such as extended range, trajectory shaping, strategic relocatable targets, and hardened deeply buried targets, that the next generation ICBM could address. The Land Based Strategic Nuclear Deterrence Mission Needs Statement (MNS) drew from the analysis done in the BMR study in documenting the need for ICBMs beyond 2020. To expand on the MNS and address alternatives for the follow on ICBM, AFSPC plans to conduct an analysis of alternatives in FY04 and FY05 with an IOC by 2018. This work will ensure the requirements generation process and the acquisition process remain on track for the future ICBM force.” (p. 41)

“Trident SSBN: . ..The Administration intends to convert four SSBNs from the current force of 18 submarines to carry special operations forces as well as conventional cruise missiles. Achieving this force structure also requires converting four of the eight Trident I (C-4) SSBNs to carry the Trident D-5 missile. The Navy has extended the Trident hull life to 44 years. This in turn will require the DoD to extend the service life of the D-5 SWS [Strategic Weapons System] as well. The first of the 14 Trident SSBNs remaining in service will he retired in 2029.” (p. 42)

“Trident II SLBM: … DoD will fund the D-5 Life Extension Program, which continues production of D-5 missiles, and upgrades the guidance and missile electronics systems on existing missiles. The continued production of additional D-5 missiles is needed in order to prevent a shortage of missiles in the next decade.” (p. 42)

“Follow-on SSBN: … DoD assumes the continued requirement for a sea-based strategic nuclear force. Therefore, the timeframe when the next generation SSBN will need to be deployed is about 2029 when the first of the remaining operational Trident SSBNs is planned to be retired. The Navy is currently studying two options for future follow-on SSBNs: (1) a variant of Virginia-class nuclear attack submarines (SSN); and (2) a dedicated SSBN (either a new design or a derivative of the Trident SSBN) … If the decision is made to develop a new dedicated SSBN, a program would have to be initiated around 2016 to ensure that a new platform is available in 2029.” (p. 42)

“Follow-on SLBM. A new SLBM would be needed in about 2029 to match the schedule for a follow-on SSBN. The Navy has begun studies to examine range-payload requirements and missile size, but no specific plans for a follow-on SLBM at this point other than extending the service life of the Trident D-5.” (p. 42)

“Common Missile. The Department of Defense doe not plan to pursue a common ICBM/SLBM ballistic missile at this time. However, the Air Force and Navy are currently cooperating in research and development on common technologies related to current and future ballistic missiles – the Guidance Applications Prograrn (GAP), Reentry Systems Applications Program (RSAP), Propulsion Applications Program (PAP), and Technology for the Sustainment of Strategic Systems (TSSS) programs.” (p. 42-43)

Heavy Bombers/Air Launched Cruise Missiles (p. 43)
Strategic Bombers. The Air Force plans to keep the current B-2 and B-52 fleet operational far another 35-40 years. An aggressive sustainment and modernization effort for both platforms is required to support this plan. In particular, upgrades to communications, avionics, processors, radar systems, displays, and navigation equipment are essential to keep the fleet affordable and operationally relevant throughout this period.

“Assured, worldwide, survivable two way connectivity between the National Command Authorities and the strategic bomber force is a fundamental element of strategic command and control. B-52s and B-2s must transition to Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite communications in order to ensure continued Connectivity with National Command elements.”

“Situational Awareness (SA) and electronic countermeasures (ECM) remain the highest priority B-52 upgrades. The inability to adapt to and counter threats, the high failure rate of SA and ECM equipment components, parts obsolescence, and a vanishing vendor base severely limit the B-52’s ability to operate in a combat environment. To that end, the Electronic Countermeasure Improvement, Situational Awareness Defense Improvement, and Low-Mid Band Jammer replacement programs are essential to ensuring the B-52 remains a viable combat asset beyond 2006.”

The B-52 also requires a highly reliable and accurate navigation system to conduct worldwide tasking and nuclear weapons deliveries. The Inertial Navigation system (INS) represents the heart of the B-52 navigation suite but is reaching the end of service life and is increasingly cost-prohibitive to support. The Avionics Mid-Life Improvement program addresses this issue by replacing the INS and other obsolete B-52 avionics components required for precision navigation and weapons delivery.”

Several upgrades are currently underway on the B-2. These upgrades include AHFM (Alternate High Frequency Material) which improves the ability to maintain the low observable materials of the aircraft: UHF/SATCOM upgrade; JASSM upgrade; Mk-82 Smart Bomb Rack Assembly upgrade; and Link-16 upgrade.

“Air-Launched Weapons Systems. The Air Force recently determined that its current force of cruise missiles can be sustained until 2030.” (p. 43)

“Follow-on Strategic Bombers” Based on current estimates, “a new bomber will need to be operational by approximately 2040. A need for additional or improved bomber capabilities could, however, move the ‘need date’ closer to the present… The Air Force recently funded a science and technology effort for the Long-Range Strike Aerospace Platform-X to further explore options.” (p. 43-44)

“Follow-on Air Launched Weapon Systems. There are no plans at this time for a follow-on nuclear ALCM… However, conventional cruise missile programs (such as the Extended Range Cruise Missile) are planned that could support an accelerated timetable if necessary, but would have to be modified to carry nuclear warheads.”

Dual-Capable Aircraft, DoD is considering options and their associated costs to either extend the life of the dual capable F-16C/Ds and F-15Es or make a block upgrade to the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft… The Operational Requirements Document for the JSF requires that initial design permit nuclear capability to be incorporated at a later date (after IOC, currently scheduled for 2012) at an affordable price.”

“Dual-capable aircraft and nuclear weapons in support of NATO. DoD will not seek any change to the current posture in FY02 but will review both issues to assess whether any modifications to the current posture are appropriate to adapt to the changing threat environment. A plan is already underway to conduct a NATO review of U.S. and allied dual capable aircraft in Europe and to present recommendations to Ministers in summer of 2002. Dual capable aircraft and deployed weapons are important to the continued viability of NATO’s nuclear deterrent strategy and any changes need to be discussed within the alliance.” (p. 44)

Tankers The current fleet of KC-135s will be operational for the next 35-40 years. The aging fleet will begin a long phased retirement starting in 2013 and continuing until approximately 2040. The Air Force anticipates constant upgrades to avionics, displays, and navigation equipment over the coming years. However, the current KC-135 fleet is not equipped with a survivable communications capability, limiting its effectiveness in a stressed environment. The Air Force is evaluating a follow-on tanker in conjunction with a follow-on common airframe air1ift and special missions platform. The service is also considering the lease or purchase of 100 off-the-shelf 767 tankers as an interim measure prior to the need to produce the KC-X replacement platform. In developing altematives, consideration needs to be given to the possibility that aircraft will operate in a nuclear, biological and chemical weapons environment.” (p. 44-45)

Robust Flight Testing, Aging, and Surveillance. Air Force and Navy nuclear systems require robust flight-testing programs to provide operationally representative data on weapon system performance and to predict weapon system reliability and accuracy… Currently, only the D-5 missile system fulfils the required annual flight tests.” (p. 45)

“Nuclear Warhead Sustainment… The active stockpile quantities will be sufficient to arm the operationally deployed and responsive nuclear force, and provide sufficient logistics spares. The inactive stockpile will consist of warhead types in the active stockpile plus the W84 and B83 Mod 0, which have no active stockpile counterparts. The W62 warhead will be retired in FY09.” (p. 45)

“The NNSA his initiated a program to energize design work on advanced concepts at the three design laboratories. This initiative will be focused on evolving DoD requirements.” (p. 46)

Limitations in the Present Nuclear Force
“Today’s nuclear arsenal continues to reflect its Cold War origin, characterized by moderate delivery accuracy, limited earth penetrator capability, high-yield warheads, silo and sea-based ballistic missiles with multiple independent reentry vehicles, and limited retargeting capability.”

“New capabilities must be developed to defeat emerging threats such as hard and deeply buried targets (HDBT), to find and attack mobile and relocatable targets, to defeat chemical or biological agents, and to improve accuracy and limit collateral damage. Development of these capabilities, to include extensive research and timely fielding of new systems to address these challenges, are imperative to make the New Triad a reality.”

Defeating Hard and Deeply Buried Targets
“More than 70 countries now use underground Facilities (UGFs) for military purposes. In June 1998, the Defense Science Board Task force on Underground Facilities that there are over 10,000 UGFs worldwide. Approximately 1,100 UGFS were known or suspected strategic (WMD, ballistic missile basing, leadership or top echelon command and control) sites. Updated estimates form DIA reveal this number has now grown to over 1,400. A majority of the strategic facilities are deep underground facilities. These facilities are generally the most difficult to defeat because of the depth of the facility and the uncertainty of the exact location. At present the United States lacks adequate means to deal with these strategic facilities. A detailed report on this issue was provided to the Congress recently (Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets, July 2001). (p. 46)

“To deny the enemy sanctuary in HDBTs requires timely identification and characterization of potential targets, realistic defeat alternatives, and accurate assessment of damage done by the attack. Achieving the desired level of capability requires the integration of Service and National systems into a robust, highly responsive system of systems capable of addressing the threat. Improved command and control and intelligence in support of the New Triad will be a key enabler to address this capability shortfall.” (p. 47)

“In general, current conventional weapons can only ‘deny’ or ‘disrupt’ the functioning of HDBTs and require highly accurate intelligence and precise weapon delivery – a degree of accuracy and precision frequently missing under actual combat conditions, Similarly, current conventional weapons are not effective for the long term physical destruction of deep, underground facilities. (p. 47)

“The United States currently has a very limited ground penetration capability with its only earth penetrating nuclear weapon, the B61 Mod 11 gravity bomb. This single-yield, non-precision weapon cannot survive penetration into many types of terrain in which hardened underground facilities are located. Given these limitations, the targeting of a number of hardened, underground facilities is limited to an attack against surface features, which does not does not provide a high probability of defeat of these important targets.” (p. 47)

“With a more effective earth penetrator, many buried targets could be attacked using a weapon with a much lower yield than would be required with a surface burst weapon. This lower yield would achieve the same damage while producing less fallout (by a factor of ten to twenty) than would the much larger yield surface burst. For defeat of very deep or larger underground facilities, penetrating weapons with large yields would be needed to collapse the facility.” (p. 47)

“To defeat HDBT it is necessary to improve significantly U.S. means to locate, identify, characterize, and target HDBTs. This objective also requires deliberate pre-planned and practiced missions and the development and procurement of several types of conventional earth penetrating munitions. A number of Special Operations Forces and information capabilities will need to be developed to support this goal. Investment and organization will yield a new level of capability for the stated objectives by 2007, with new technologies deployed by 2012. One effort to improve the U.S. capability against HBDTs is a joint DoD/DOE phase 6.2/6.2A Study to be started in Apri1 2002. This effort will identify whether an existing warhead in a 5,000 pound class penetrator would provide significantly enhanced earth penetration capabilities compared to the B61 Mod 11.” (p. 47)

Mobile and Relocatable Targets
“One of the greatest challenges today is accounting for the location uncertainty of mobile and relocatable targets… To respond to this challenge, collection systems and techniques that defeat adversary relocation capabilities must be developed. Sensors must also be capable of defeating camouflage and concealment efforts and detecting and exploiting new command and control systems.”

“To locate successfully and maintain track on mobile targets until a weapon can be planned and executed, several enhancements need to be made to the current collection capability. Today’s satellite constellation is not optimized for the current and developing mobile target challenge. Planned improvements to this constellation would provide the capability to rapidly and accurately locate and track mobile targets from the time they deploy from garrison until they return. Sensors with rapid revisit or dwell capability over deployment areas combined with automated exploitation sides are required to provide this capability.” (p. 47-48)

Defeat of Chemical and Biological Agents
DoD and DOE efforts are underway to counter the asymmetric use of chemical and biological weapons (referred to as agent defeat). Agent Defeat Weapon (ADW) concepts are being evaluated to deny access to, immobilize, neutralize, or destroy chemical or biological weapons. Overcoming uncertainties in intelligence regarding agent production and storage locations as well as physical geometries of known facilities and contents appear to be the largest challenges. A variety of ADW concepts are currently under study, including thermal, chemical, or radiological neutralization of chemical/biological materials in production or storage facilities, as well as several types of kinetic penetrators to immobilize or deny use of those materials.” (p. 48)

Improved Accuracy for Effectiveness and Reduced Collateral Damage
“Desired capabilities for nuclear weapons systems in flexible, adaptable strike plans include options for variable and reduced yields, high accuracy, and timely employment. These capabilities would help deter enemy use of WMD or limit collateral damage, should the United States have to defeat enemy WMD capabilities.” (p. 48)

Nuclear Force Modernization
“The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has initiated a Strategic Deterrent Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment to characterize the requirements for nuclear weapon systems in the 2020 timeframe. The assessment is to be complete in early FY03.” (p. 48)

“DoD, in coordination with the NNSA, will evaluate nuclear weapon options to increase weapon system effectiveness and flexibility and to limit collateral damage. Capability improvements are likely to be needed to correct the limitations of the existing nuclear forces.” (p. 49)

V. NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL
Initial Reductions
“When these reductions [i.e. retire 50 Peacekeepers, remove 4 Trident SSBNs, and convert B-1’s to solely conventional role] are complete in FY06, the number of U.S. operationally deployed strategic warheads will be reduced by about 1,300 warheads accountable under the START I Treaty (based on attribution rules at the time these decisions were made). The four Trident submarines that will be removed from service will remain accountable under the START I Treaty.” (p. 51)

“The Department analyzed the role of the Peacekeeper against projected threats in the post Cold War environment and judged that its retirement would not have an adverse effect on the sufficiency of U.S. nuclear forces… Funding has been programmed, beginning in FY03, to retire these weapons in a phased approach to coincide with the Trident D-5 transition to the Pacific fleet and to retain and maintain the silos for future options. These silos, and the four Trident submarines converted to SSGNs, will remain accountable under the START I Treaty.”

“Additional strategic nuclear reduction will be achieved by lowering the number of warheads assigned to the operationally deployed force. By the end of FY07, U.S. operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads should total no more than 3,800. The drawdown of the operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads will preserve force structure in that, aside from the Peacekeeper ICBM and the four Trident SSBNs, no additional strategic delivery platforms are scheduled to be eliminated from strategic service. These reductions are to be completed between FY03 and FY07, and will result in approximately a 40% reduction in number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads from the present.”

Longer Term Reductions
“With regard to additional reductions beyond FY07, the United States plans to decrease the number of warheads on its ballistic missile force by “downloading.” Regarding bombers, reductions will be made by lowering the number of operationally deployed weapons, i.e. those available for loading at operational bomber bases.”

“Warheads that will count as operationally deployed are: for ballistic missiles, the actual number of nuclear weapons loaded on the ICBMs or SLBMs; for bombers, those nuclear weapons located in weapon storage areas at bomber bases (except for a small number of spares).”

START II Treaty
“…the Russian resolution of ratification, adopted in 2000, contains unacceptable provision contrary to the new strategic framework and establishment of the New Triad.”

De-Alerting
“U.S. forces are not on “hair trigger” alert and rigorous safeguards exist to ensure the highest levels of nuclear weapons safety, security, reliability, and command and control. Multiple, stringent procedural and technical safeguards are in place to guard against U.S. accidental and unauthorized launch.”

“The New Triad addresses concerns about the accidental or unauthorized launch of certain foreign forces. For example, it provides missile defenses to protect the United States, it allies, and friends against limited or unauthorized launches. It also will provide a spectrum of defensive and non-nuclear response options to an accidental or unauthorized launch, allowing the United States to tailor an appropriate response to the specific event and to limit the danger of escalation.”

“The elimination of the Peacekeeper ICBM will be phased to correspond with the introduction of the Trident II (D-5) missile in the Pacific. As they are eliminated, those Peacekeeper missiles remaining during the elimination process will be kept on alert to provide a necessary contribution to the U.S. portfolio of capabilities.” (p. 54)

“Following the initial phase of U.S. nuclear reductions, subsequent reductions will be achieved by downloading warheads from missiles and bombers. Force structure will be retained as the basis for reconstructing the responsive force. Delivery systems will not be retired following initial reductions and downloaded warheads will be retained as needed for the responsive force.” (p. 54)

The Comprehensive Test Ban
“The United States has not conducted nuclear tests since 1992 and supports the continued observance of the testing moratorium. While the United States is making every effort to maintain the stockpile without additional nuclear testing, this may not be possible for the indefinite future. Some problems in the stockpile due to aging and manufacturing defects have already been identified. Increasingly, objective judgments about capability in a non-testing environment will become far more difficult. Each year the DoD and DOE will reassess the need to resume nuclear testing and will make recommendations to the President. Nuclear nations have a responsibility to assure the safety and reliability of their own nuclear weapons.” (p. 55)

Transparency
“The START I Treaty includes provisions that provide a useful baseline of transparency for offensive strategic forces. Any additional transparency that may be useful to provide added confidence and predictability would be in the form of separate political commitments.”